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CYBER-TERRORISM AND
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE
THIRD PILLAR PERSPECTIVE
by
NADINA FOGGETTI*
Cyber-terrorism involved a serious of conducts such as a targeted attacks, politic-
ally motivated, conducted with the help of computer technology and/or within the  
information technology, with significant consequences at economic, political and 
social level.
Against this new threat the EU is called to give a answer with the instruments  
that it have to disposal in the Third Pillar.
In front of the proliferation of acts adopted in this sector, this is a luck of a spe-
cific legal instrument in the fight against cyber-terrorism. 
The first questions that we will analyse concerning the definition of cyber-ter-
rorism. 
We will to analyse the possibility to apply of cyber-terrorism existing legal in-
struments. At the same time the fight against cyber-terrorism involves the need to  
collect systematically data and DNA data, also through Europol and Eurojust and  
to plug into databases. This data collection is essential in order to adopt the meas-
ure of execution of UN Resolutions for the prevention and repression of each typo-
logy of terrorist funding, as well as the freezing funds that are directly or indirectly  
addressed a to that end. This data is able to breach fundamental human rights.
There is the need to guarantee the right to privacy of  persons and entity in-
volved in data collected. 
In the second part of the paper we will analyse the problem of the balancing  
between the  need to  combating international  terrorism and cyber-terrorism and  
that to protect fundamental human rights, also by the study of the recent jurispru-
dence of the EC Court of First Instance. To that end we will analyse the legal in-
strument for individuals and entities in the EU law for the protection of their fun-
damental human rights.
* PhD – University of Bari, Department of International law and EU law, 
nadinafoggetti@gmail. com.
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1. A DEFINITION’S ISSUE
In 1997 Mark Pollitt drew up a definition of  cyber-terrorism, which tends to 
associate the word with a premeditated attack with political purposes, dir-
ected against information systems management that can determine serious 
consequences against targets that are not in state of war1.
There are various definitions that, over time, have been attributed to cy-
ber-terrorism. We could try to define cyber-terrorism as the use of informa-
tion  technology in  order  to  obtain  an  advantage in  a  terrorist  action  or 
strategy.
This  definition  could cover  both planned use  of  modern technologies 
and  their  possible  use.  But,  if  we  believe  that  cyber-terrorism  is  an 
autonomous conduct, probably we cannot apply any international instru-
ment currently in force. A lot of measures have been adopted in order to 
fight  international terrorism at international and EU level. It is worth men-
tioning  some of these standards such as the Framework Decision of 13 June 
2002 on the fight against terrorism2 and the proposal for a Council frame-
work  decision  amending  the  Framework  Decision  2002/475/JHA  on  the 
fight against terrorism.3
The European Convention for the Prevention of terrorism4 was signed in 
Warsaw on May 15, 2005. Article 1 of the FD n. 475/2002 states that each 
Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that in their legal 
order the intentional  acts which,  given their nature or context,  may seri-
ously damage a country or an international organization where committed 
also with the aim of causing extensive destruction to a Government or pub-
lic  facility,  a  transport system, an infrastructure facility,  including an in-
formation system, are considered as a crime. 
Indirectly, cyber-terrorism can be included under this definition.
However, the system is seen as an objective to which a terrorist act could 
be directed and not as a means by which terrorist cells can organize and 
launch the attack.
1 Pollit M.M. 1998,  Cyber-terrorism Fact or Fancy?, Proceedings of the 20th National Information  
Security  Conference,  in  Pollitt,  M.M.  (edit  by),"Cyber-terrorism:  Fact  or  Fancy?,"  Computer  
Fraud and Security.
2 Council framework decision on combating terrorism, GU L 164, 22nd of June 2002, p. 3.
3 Proposal of a Framework decision that modify the Framework decision 2002/475/JAI on combating  
terrorism, {SEC(2007) 1424} {SEC(2007) 1425} /* COM/2007/0650 def. - CNS 2007/0236 */
4 European Council  Convention for the prevention of terrorism,  signed in Warsaw on May 16, 
2005, entry to force on June, 12007. www.coe.int  
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A reference to cyber-terrorism is in the proposal for a Council Frame-
work Decision amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating 
terrorism.
In  this  document,  the  institutions  said  that  modern  information  and 
communication technologies play an important role in the development of 
the threat which is currently represented by terrorism: they may serve as a 
means of dissemination of propaganda aiming at mobilization and recruit-
ment as well as instructions and online manuals intended for training or 
planning of attacks, addressed at current and potential supporters.
The Council, in particular, said that the Internet may serve as one of the 
principal boosters of the processes of radicalization and recruitment:  it  is 
used to inspire and mobilize local networks and individuals in Europe and 
also it serves as a source of information on terrorist means and methods, 
thus functioning as a ‘virtual training camp’. The dissemination of terrorist 
propaganda and terrorist expertise through the Internet has therefore em-
powered terrorists, making the terrorist threat grow. Moreover, the import-
ance of such dissemination can only be expected to increase,  taking into 
consideration the fast growing number of users that will make the Internet 
an even more vital element of modern society than it is today. This proposal 
updates the Framework Decision on combating terrorism and aligns it with 
the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of terrorism, through 
including public provocation to commit terrorist  offences,  recruitment for 
terrorism and training for terrorism in its concept of terrorism. In the con-
text of the Council of Europe, in fact, the only convention that might include 
cyber-terrorism is the European Convention on the prevention of Terrorism, 
signed in Warsaw on May 15, 2005 and recently entered into force.
Articles  5 and 6 of  this  Convention states that  "public  provocation to 
commit  a  terrorist  offence"  means  the  distribution,  or  otherwise  making 
available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commis-
sion of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly ad-
vocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences 
may be committed.
Even though Articles 5 and 6 do not mention cyber-terrorism, they state 
that each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish 
public  provocation  to  commit  a  terrorist  attack   or  recruitment  terrorist 
cells, regardless of the means used, as criminal offences under its domestic 
law.
Since  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  are  generic,  they  could  make 
back the terrorist actions carried out through the Internet. But it is difficult 
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to put cyber terrorism in the definition of terrorism included in the Conven-
tion.
For the purposes of this Convention, "terrorist offence" means any of the 
offences within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the 
Appendix. 
Cyber-terrorism is not even mentioned in the Budapest Convention on 
Cyber crime drafted in the Council of Europe and also recently ratified by 
Italy. The problem that arises in this respect is the need to qualify on cyber-
terrorism separately, by making a conceptual division between cyber crimes 
and terrorism. The whole offence will be punishable in this way on the basis 
of different standards. The existing measures may be applied to the recruit-
ment, training and public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, made 
through the Internet.  However they do not apply to terrorist  acts under-
taken and completed through the internet. For example, these measures do 
not apply if a terrorist group makes an illegal access to a computer system 
with the ultimate purpose of financing terrorists, or it makes a computer at-
tack that endangers international security for terrorist purposes. 
These facts cannot be classified in any of the acts mentioned. In the war 
against terrorism, human rights norms are often perceived as a constraint 
for an effective response to the danger. Many Governments, International 
organization  at  universal  and  regional  level  claim  indeed  that  the  very 
nature of the threat requires them to intervene even at expenses of basic 
democratic  principles,  such as respect for personal freedom and non-dis-
crimination, or propriety. In this contest the right to privacy takes a dual 
significance5. It is a right, but it is also important because its enforcement 
helps to protect other fundamental rights.
2. EUROPEAN MEASURES AGAINST
TERRORISM AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The EU and the States are implementing surveillance power. The EU has 
adopted a wide range of legislation in the field of counter-terrorism, such as 
Council Common Positions and the Council Regulation.6
A Common Position on combating terrorism, for example, which copies 
almost all provisions of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).7 A Com-
mon Position on the application of specific  measures to combat terrorism 
5 Costamagna F.  2007,  Derogating  from  ECHR  Obligations  to  Fight  International  Terrorism:  
Analysis of Some Controversial Issues, La Comunità internazionale, pp. 111 – 150.
6 Council  Regulation EC n.  2580/2001 on specific  measures  directed against  certain  persons and  
entities with a view to combating terrorism, Official Journal of EC,  L 344 , of 27 December 2001. 
7 Council  Common Position  2001/931/CFSP  of  27  December  2001  on the  application  of  specific  
measures to combat terrorism, Official Journal of EU,  L 344, of 27 December 2001.
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and a Council  Regulation on specific  restrictive measure directed against 
certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism. In order to 
better counteract the financing of terrorism, the European Parliament and 
the European Council also amended Council Directive 91/308/EEC on pre-
vention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money launder-
ing (Directive 2001/97/EC). In addition to the Council Framework decision 
of  13  June  2002  on  combating  terrorism  constitutes  a  central  piece  of 
counter-terrorism legislation in EU. In order to implement Paragraph 1 of 
United Nation Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) at EU level, the exist-
ing institutions with legal personality, i.e. Europol and Eurojust have been 
strengthened.  However,  according  to  Article  30  of  the  TUE,  Europol  is 
meant to grow into the operation task of investigating terrorist offences; a 
participation of Europol in joint investigation teams has been envisaged in 
the  Council  Framework  Decision  of  13  June  2002  on  joint  investigating 
teams. The Schengen Information System (SIS) was seen as a compensation 
mechanisms for the removal of internal borders. The Schengen Information 
System has been replaced by a new system, the Schengen Information Sys-
tem II (SIS II), which shall allow new Member States to be integrated into 
the system.8 It is interesting to note that according to the Monitoring group 
which assists  the Sanction Committee against  the Taliban and AL Qaeda 
pursuant  to  Security  resolution  1390  (2002),  States  participating  in  the 
Schengen area are not able to prevent the entry into or the transit through 
their territories of members of these two groups. As highlighted in the Mon-
itoring Group’s second report of 22 August 2002 the SIS contained by then 
only around 40 of the 219 names of individuals who appear on the list of 
names annexed to resolution 1390 (2002). 
In accordance with the decision SIS II, Europol and Eurojust have access 
to  certain  categories  of  records.  These  institutions  have  access  to  data 
entered in the SIS II under Articles. 26 and 38. By the same measures, the 
powers of control and access to Europol have been extended. The activity of 
exchange of information between Member States and Community institu-
tions has been intensified following the adoption of the Hague program 
which allowed the introduction of the principle of availability of informa-
tion9. Under this principle, in short, national and European institutions en-
gaged in the processing of data in order to prevent and combat internation-
al terrorism, can expand the capacity of access to national databases without 
8 Council  Regulation (EC) No 2424/2001 of  6  December  2001 on the  development  of  the  second  
generation of  the  Schengen Information System (SIS II), Official  Journal of  EC, L 328 of 13 
December 2001, pp. 4–6
9 Hosein G., L. M.., 2005, Threatening the Open Society: Comparing Anti-Terror Policies in the US  
and Europe,  International privacy, pp. 45-67.
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the permission of the court and beyond the limits of knowledge required by 
state law.
This has caused a huge traffic of information and data passing through 
the use of modern information technologies. 
The use of IT systems to launch attacks has caused a huge traffic of data. 
The data resulting from the activities of cyber-terrorism is often combined 
with  data  neutral.  These  data  shall  in  databases  containing  information 
about terrorists or suspected. Even the authorities have widely used this in-
formation to monitor terrorist  activities and cyber-terrorism. In particular 
the object of control are the transnational travels of individuals.
In this context it is important to recall that on July 26 2007 the United 
States and the European Union have concluded the agreement on the trans-
fer of passenger data contained in the Passenger Name Records (PNR).10
This agreement has followed another one previously concluded between 
the same parties that was submitted to the Court of Justice in order to assess 
its  legitimacy in  the  light  of  the directive  on the protection of personal 
data.11
The Court limits itself to assess the legal basis on which the decision to 
conclude the above mentioned agreement was issued.  In this  way it  has 
failed to enter the substance of the matter relating to the protection of per-
sonal data in the third pillar, and more specifically in the fight against inter-
national terrorism. The court held that the transfer of personal data con-
tained in the cards for passengers to Customs and Border Protection of the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security was a treatment concerning public 
security and state activities in the field of criminal law.
The Court ruled that the decision on a related processing of personal 
data in accordance with Art. 3, No. 2 of Directive 95/46 did not fall within 
the scope of the directive. Therefore the Court concluded that it was neces-
sary to cancel the decision. Following the decision cited, on July 23 2007 the 
Council  signed the Agreement between the EU and the USA on the pro-
cessing  and  transfer  of  passenger  reservation  Passenger  Name  Record 
(PNR) on the basis of Articles 24 and 38 TEU. 
The conclusion of the PNR has excluded the application of the directive 
on the protection of personal data.
10 Council Decision n. 2007/551/CFSP/JHA of 23 July 2007 on the signing, on behalf of the European 
Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States  
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement), in Official Journal, L 204/16 of 
4 August 2007.
11 Judgement of the Court of 30 May 2006, C-317 e C-318/04, European Parliament c. Council of  
the European Union, http://curia.europa.eu/ 
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Therefore it is not possible to apply the limits imposed by data retention 
directive especially by Art. 25. The just mentioned article provides that in 
order to allow the transfer of personal data outside the EU, the country re-
ceiving the data must ensure adequate protection of the received data.
Thus, if the legal basis were Art. 25, the institutions should have made 
an assessment about the adequacy of the level of protection granted by the 
USA to personal data.
In the United States of America there is no general law on the protection 
of personal data that also guarantees the right to judicial protection against 
potential abuse.
The US legislation concerning personal data consists of a series of agree-
ments and sectoral codes of conduct. There is not an authority comparable 
to those established at national and EU level.12
We could conclude that the level of protection is not adequate to the re-
quirements of Art. 25 of the Directive on data retention.
The change in the legal basis has enabled the institutions to lower the 
level of protection of personal data in order to prevent and combat interna-
tional terrorism.
3. THE EU ANTITERRORISM MEASURE AND THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE EU AND ECHR  PROSPECTIVE
A further issue that we must examine is whether the acts in question meet 
the fundamental principles of European law and European Convention on 
Human Rights. The protection of privacy under the law remains anchored 
however to the First pillar, while the fight against terrorism and crime takes 
place in the Second and Third pillar. For this reason it is difficult to balance 
the protection of privacy with the fight against international terrorism and 
to assess the impact of measures taken by institutions in order to reach this 
specific purpose. 
In the just mentioned case law, the European Court of the Court held 
that the powers of the Community shall be exercised in accordance with in-
ternational law. This provision applies even in the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security in the implementation of resolutions adopted by 
the Security Council under Chapter VII of Charter.13
The EU Court states that the Regulation is an EU act and then the Court 
is asked to assess their compatibility with fundamental rights.
12 Simoncini M., L.M. 2007, Legislazione antiterrorismo e tutela della privacy, in Rivista trimestrale  
di diritto pubblico, p. 659 – 701.
13 Judgement of the Court of  20 May 2008, C-91/05, Commission vs Council, in www.europa.eu 
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In this contest, the EU Court of Justice in a Case of September 3 , 2008, 
annuls the Council Regulation on May 27, 2002, No. 881, which imposes re-
strictive measures directed against  certain persons and entities associated 
with Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and repealing Regu-
lation (EC) No 467/2001.14
But it orders that the effects of Regulation No. 881/2002 to be maintained, 
so far as they concern Mr Kadi and the Al Barakaat International Founda-
tion, for a period that may not exceed three months running from the date 
of delivery of this judgement.15
However, the reasoning of the Court of Justice clearly shows the preval-
ence of the need to respond to the terrorist threat.
The Court, therefore, claims that the fight against terrorism  prevails on 
fundamental rights.
In the second instance we must analyse if the PNR Agreement impair the 
European Convention on data retention and European Convention on Hu-
man rights.
To analyse the admissibility of the transfer of personal data in the  light 
of the European Convention for the protection of data, we must consider 
the letter sent in July 2007 by DHS particularly the statement which out-
lined the terms and conditions for the data transfer .
The letter states that the data transferred to US authorities will be used 
solely for the prevention and suppression of international terrorism and re-
lated crimes and the prosecution of other serious crimes, including transna-
tional organized crime. Art. 5 of Convention for the Protection of Individu-
als with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data states that person-
al data undergoing automatic processing shall be stored for specified and 
legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible with those pur-
poses. The purpose of the fight against terrorism is determined. On the con-
trary, we cannot say that the aim is determined or determinable in relation 
with the crimes.  The letter does not  reveal,  in  fact,  what are the serious 
crimes listed, which will be the criteria to be taken into consideration in or-
der to identify these types of crimes. 
We can therefore conclude that  the agreement signed counteracts  the 
Convention signed by EU Member States in relation to the obligation to en-
sure the definition and certainty of the purpose for which this is done.
The agreement also contrasts with Art. 6 of the Convention concerning 
personal data.
14 Judgement of the Court of 3 September 2008, C-402/05 P e C-415/05, Yassin Abdullah Kadi c.  
Council, in www.europa.eu.
15 Council Regulation of  29 May 2002, Official Journal of EU, L 139, 2002.
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For this particular category of personal data, the Convention provides 
that they may not be processed automatically if national laws do not estab-
lish appropriate safeguards.
The same agreement also does not allow an adequate protection of the 
right to correct personal data subject to treatment and thus it is contrary to 
Art. 8 of the European Convention for the protection of personal data.
The PNR agreement and the letter DHS, in fact, guarantee only the ap-
plication of the law in force in the U.S. on the matter, such as the Patriot Act. 
But it  is applicable only to U.S. citizens.
Nor is it true that the mere reference made by the DHS letter of this le-
gislation ensure the extension of its scope to individuals holding the data 
processed regardless of the nationality of the same.
Previous agreements on cross-border transfer of personal data between 
EU and U.S. ensured a higher protection.
The agreement is contrary to Art. 8 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights as interpreted by the Strasbourg court.
In particular, analysing the prevailing case law of the European Court, it 
can be concluded that the collection and transmission of personal informa-
tion by public authorities breach Art. 8.
On the basis of the criteria identified by the Court in its jurisprudence, 
that a treatment could be determined, must pursue a legitimate aim of pub-
lic interest, and it must be proportionate.16
The Court held that in order to assess the proportionality of the treat-
ment itself,  it  is necessary to verify compliance with the law on access to 
their data by the interested parties. The discipline mentioned does not re-
spect the principle of proportionality. 
The obligations from both are incompatible with the Convention on the 
Protection of Personal Data and with the provisions of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights.
4. THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS
AGAINST ACTS AFFECTING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
In the fight against terrorism and in the internet era, it is necessary to pro-
tect  the  international  and  European  security,  but  also  the  fundamental 
rights.  In  particular  it  is  necessary  the  judicial  protection  of  individuals 
against the abuses of the Authority also in the fights against terrorism. At 
EU level, citizens can appeal to the Court of First Instance and then to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, but we have seen that recent case 
16 Cfr. Judgement of European Court of Human Rights, n.  9248/81, of 26th of March 1987, 
Leander Vs Sweden, www.coe.int 
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law is not in favour of the protection of fundamental rights when dealing 
with the fight against terrorism. We must then determine whether the con-
clusion of the PNR is attributable to the states. In order to solve this prob-
lem we must refer to the legal basis on which the agreement was concluded.
The legal basis is Articles 24 and 38 EU Treaty. An analysis of these pro-
visions easily shows the crucial role played by Member States in concluding 
such agreements.
Art. 24 states that the Council may decide by a qualified majority wheth-
er the agreement is expected to implement a common position or a joint ac-
tion. It should be noted that these acts must be approved unanimously. Art. 
24 refers to Art. 23, par. 2 which states that "If a member of the Council de-
clares that, for important reasons of national policy, intends to oppose the 
adoption of a decision taken by qualified majority, a vote. The Council, act-
ing  by  a  qualified  majority,  requests  that  the  matter  be  referred  to  the 
European Council for decision by unanimity”. 
The role of the States is essential in this case. Data processing must re-
spect the principle of proportionality.
In this particular context, the Court has noted, on several occasions, that 
in  order to assess  the proportionality  of the same treatment,  states must 
guarantee the right of access to data. The agreement provides only for trans-
ferring data from European airlines to US authorities.
The agreement conflicts with the European Convention on Human rights.
The states are liable for the breach of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights in the fight against terrorism.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Many countries introduced extraordinary laws and policies and emergency 
legislation. We see the introduction of new surveillance power of the State 
in answers to terrorism and cyber-terrorism. Privacy was also affected by 
the use of very technologically advanced instruments of control.17
The administration of emergency has ultimately become condicio sine 
qua non for the maintenance of international security. 
In the USA and UK many of these laws have come to be questioned in 
parliaments, through the media, the courts, and in the public sphere. Some 
have been seriously amended or found unconstitutional while others have 
been enhanced. 
The program for intercepting telephone calls and e-mail authorized by 
Bush 2001 and renewed in subsequent years, was ultimately blocked for vi-
17 Terrasi, L.M. 2007, Trasmissione dei dati eprsonali e tutela della riservtezza: l’accordo tra Unione  
euroepa e Stati uniti del 2007, Rivista di diritto internazionale, pp.375-389.
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olation of the First and the Fourth Amendment. In particular, the Court of 
Detroit noted that "It is not possible to pursue the goal of security by de-
priving citizens of constitutionally guaranteed rights".
The administrative emergency, ultimately, must ensure the protection of 
human  rights.  The  real  problem  is  the  disappearance  of  the  temporary 
nature of the emergency requirement.
The  doctrine  held  that  in  order  to  guarantee  an  adequate  balance 
between fundamental rights and combating terrorism, it is appropriate to 
take precautionary measures to combat the threat in question. The problem 
of collective security against the terrorist threat should move from the emer-
gency plan in order to attain prevention administration in the first moment, 
and finally the precautionary administration.
What is more significant, in view of the measures taken to combat inter-
national terrorism, will  be the loss of the temporary nature of the emer-
gency requirement.
In short, the emergency and the rules designed to adjust from temporary 
have become permanent. 
The  doctrine  held  that,  in  order  to  achieve  an  appropriate  balance 
between fundamental rights and the fight against terrorism, precautionary 
measures are needed to combat the threat in question.18
The  problem  of  collective  security  against  the  terrorist  threat  should 
move from the emergency plan, that of prevention first and then the precau-
tionary.19
The aim should be to find models of public administration to limit the 
risks linked to terrorism. In this way the regulation of an increasingly less 
certain risk would meet the policy to act gradually against the urgency of 
the threat. 
If we could apply the precautionary principle in the fight against terror-
ism, with the procedural and substantive content of the principle,  as de-
veloped by the Court of Justice relating to the environment and health, we 
might  conclude that  the administrative  action  in  this  area  would be  en-
riched with a connotation of a technical nature.
If the precautionary principle to become the administrative method of 
action in the fight against the terrorist threat, the assessment of the appro-
priateness and validity of the measures would be needed.
In this way, when facing a less certain risk of a terrorist attack, it is ne-
cessary to respond gradually. In this perspective we could get two positive 
18 Cfr. De Leonardis, R.I. 2005, Il principio di precauzione nell’amministrazione del rischio, Milano.
19 Cfr. Simoncini, Legislazione antiterrorismo e privacy, cit. p. 985.
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effects.  First, it  is possible to secure provisional  measures and make pro-
gressive adjustments that are commensurate with the threat.
Where  the  risk  is  only  "hypothetical",  the  individual  recipient  of  the 
measure  could  require  the  annulment  of  the  issued  decision  before  the 
Court of First instance on the basis of the lack of conditions that justify the 
adoption of precautionary measures.20
However even when we do not reach the application of precautionary 
measures, the states must apply the principle of proportionality, in accord-
ance with the interpretation given by the Court of Justice and the European 
Court on Human Rights. The Court maintained that the proportionality test 
has to be applied by taking into consideration a number of factors, such as 
the nature of the rights affected and the duration of the measures.
The Court made clear that the States are bound to the continuous reas-
sessment of the effectiveness of the measures adopted and to repeal if they 
are found inadequate to meet the danger.
A further element that plays an increasingly important role in assessing 
the measures of proportionality is the existence of safeguards against the 
abuse of emergency powers. When the Executive interferes on fundamental 
values,  such as personal  freedom or privacy,  the derogating measures is 
proportionate only when it provides a meaningful degree of judicial or in-
dependent control.
However, we doubt that the EU law, today, ensured an effective remedy 
for those affected and, hence, that the measures do not  meet the propor-
tionality requirement.
20 Cfr. De Leonardis, R.I. 2005, Il principio di precauzione nell’amministrazione del rischio, cit.
